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Abstract
Encryption and decryption techniques protect the confidentiality of information ex-
changed in a network whereas digital signature is electronic signing of data that provide
senders authentication using its secret key and verification using its public key and other
domain parameters. A combination of encipherment and digital signing of message im-
munes it from most of the active attacks such as modification of data, masquerading and
repudiation Elliptic curve discrete logarithmic problem (ECDLP) is the problem of finding
the scalar multiplier knowing the corresponding points on an elliptic curve. ECDLP is very
complex and difficult to solve compared to any standard inverse operation of a one-way-
trapdoor function such as Discrete Logarithm Problem or Factorization problem. Blind
signature allows a user to obtain a signature from an authority on any document, in such a
way that the authority learns nothing about the message that is being signed. The blind-
ness is an important property which distinguishes the blind signature from other signature
schemes. Blind signature is an important cryptographic primitive used in protocols such
as electronic voting systems and cash payment systems. Since an ECDLP enjoys a large
space and time complexity and blind signature ensures anonymity of clients message while
obtaining a signature from a trusted party, we aim at designing a blind signature scheme
based upon ECDLP which is supposed to have a low computation cost and low communi-
cation overhead. The signature should be such that it has a small size, it is highly secured
and is resistant to elliptic curve cryptography based attacks such as forgery attack, MOV
attack etc.
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1 Introduction
In present world anonymous digital signature has got a vast field of applications like electronic
voting system,e-banking etc for which the only solution is blind signature strategy.
1.1 Digital Signature
Signature is a method to authenticate any document. It is a proof to the recipient that the
document comes from the correct entity (sender). In the present world most of the documents
are electronic due to the cult usage of the computer and its applications like email, e-banking,
e-voting, etc. Thus the message, data, documents or any other materials in electronic format
has to be signed electronically. This signature that is done electronically is known as Digital
Signature.[1,2]
1.1.1 Why Digital Signature Is Required ???
The need and importance of Digital Signature can be explained by the following example:-
Suppose that J sends an authenticated message to M. The following disputes may arise:
1. M tries to forge another message and claims that it came from J. M has to create a message
and append an authentication code using J and M shared key.
2. It may so happen that J denies sending the message. Because it is very much possible for M
to forge a message, it cannot be proved that J in fact sent the message.
Both scenarios are of equal concern. For example in the first scenario, a transfer of electronic
funds takes place, and the receiver increases the amount of funds transferred and claims that the
larger amount had arrived from the sender.[2]
An example of the second scenario is that an electronic mail message contains instructions
to a stockbroker for a transaction that subsequently turns out badly. The sender pretends that
the message was never sent. If there is lack of complete trust between sender and receiver
authentication is not alone sufficient and the best possible solution to this problem is the digital
signature. The digital signature is analogous to the handwritten signature.
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1.1.2 Properties Of Digital Signature
• It should be able to authenticate the author, date and timestamp of the signature.
• At the time of the signature it should be able to authenticate the contents of the message.
• To resolve disputes it should be verifiable by third parties.
Thus, the digital signature function includes the authentication function.[2]
1.1.3 Requirements Of Digital Signature
A digital signature must fullfill the following requirements:
• Depending on the message to be signed, the signature should be a bit pattern.
• The signature should use some information unique to the sender so that forgery and denia of
service attack can be prevented.
• The digital signature should be relatively easy to produce.
• Recognition and verification of the digital signature should be relatively easy.
• Forgery of a digital signature should be computationally infeasible.
Thus the services that a Digital Signature provides are as follows[1,2] :
• Authentication
• Integrity
• Nonrepudiation (by using a trusted party)
1.1.4 Digital Signature Schemes
A digital signature scheme is a complicated mathematical scheme for proving the authenticity of
a message. A valid digital signature makes the recipient believe that the message was created by
an authentic sender. Digital signatures are commonly useful in e-commerce world and areas suc
as software distribution and defence system and in cases where forgey detection is very important.
[1,2]
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1.2 Blind Signature
Chaum introduced the concept of blind signature in 1982.In the initial scheme, the protocol
was such that the requester is allowed to obtain a valid signature s(m) for his/her message m
from a signer.The signer knows nothing about the message. Every blind signature protocol has
two properties, blindness and intractableness(difficult to manipulate). All previously prposed
blind signature schemes are based on a trapdoor function such as the integer factorization prob-
lems(IFP), discrete logarithm problems(DLP).But most of the schemes fail to meet the above two
fundamental properties Therefore, we aim to design an ECDLP-based blind signature scheme
that possesses both the above properties . Further our scheme is intended to be immune against
attacks like MOV, Baby Step Giant Step etc , and optimized in both space and time complexity
by using various techniques. [5,13]
2 Objective
The objective of the proposed project is to design a blind signature scheme.Since blind signatures
are the best and the most appropriate method of preseerving the anonymity they can be efficiently
used in any e-commerce application that gives anonymity utmost importance.Moreover since it
is a ECDLP-based blind signature it assures more security and efficiency.
3 Motivation
In e-commerce world such as an e-voting system authentication is very important as well as
anonymity and confidentiality. The answer to this problem is a blind signature that is based upon
a very difficult trapdoor function which is obviously elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.So
we intend to design such a scheme that is immune against most of the common cryptographic
attacks.
11
Chapter 2
Cryptographic Background
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4 What Is Cryptography?
Cryptography(covered text) is a technique of converting ordinary or plain text to cipher text.This
is also called as encryption. In decryption the cipher text is converted back to the plain text.
In earlier days cryptography referred to message encryption and decryption by using a common
secret key. But in moderrn times the following mechanisms are proposed. They are [1, 2]
• Symmetric Key cryptography
• Asymmetric Key cryptography
• Hashing
4.1 Cryptographic Techniques
4.1.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography
In this technique, the sender uses an encryption algorithm and a secret key known to both sender
and receiver to encrypt the message. Then the receiver oafter receiving the message uses the
decryption algorithm and the shared secret key to decrypt the message.
4.1.2 Asymmetric Key Cryptography
This technique also known as public-key-cryptography invlolves the use of 2 keys - public key
and private key. By using the public key the sender first encrypts the mesage and the receiver
uses its private key to decrypt the message as shown in figure1[1, 2]
4.1.3 Hashing
A fixed length message digest is created out of the variable length message in hashing. The
digest is of very small size than that of the message(if the message is very large). Usually both
the message and the digest are sent to the receiver. Hashing helps in providing check values
for the message
′s integrity.The hardware requirement for hashing is more than any operation.
Compression function may be used by a set of cryptographic hash functions. These hash functions
include RSA, MD etc the most poular being MD5/SHA-1 algorithm for message compression
13
Figure 1: Asymmetric Key Cryptography
which converts a message to a 128 bit/512 bit hexadecimal form. [1, 2]
4.2 Cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis is the study of methods to obtain the meaning of encrypted information(cipher
text), without requiring the access to the private parameters. Usually, this involves a pattern
study of the working methodology of the system and hence deriving the secret key. ”Cryptanaly-
sis” is also used to refer to any attempt to overcome the security of any cryptographic algorithm
and protocol in general, and not only encryption. However, cryptanalysis does not involve meth-
ods of attack that do not primarily target weaknesses in the actual cryptography.But these types
of attack pose an important concern and often are more effective than traditional cryptanalysis.
[1, 2]
4.3 Security Services
Some security services and some mechanism to implement those services are provided by the In-
ternational Telecommunication union-Telecommunication standardization Sector . The security
services include: [2]
• Authentication
• Non repudiation
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• Access Control
• Data Confidentiality
• Data Integrity
4.3.1 Authentication
This service gives a proof of authentication of the sender to the reveiver or vice-versa. In peer
entity authentication,during the connection establishment phase of connection-oriented commu-
nication it provides the authentication of the sender or receiver . In data origin authentication
i.e in connectionless communication it authenticates the source of data .[1,2]
4.3.2 Non-repudiation
To avoid repudiation(denial) by either the sender or the receiver of the data non-repudiation
service is advisable.The receiver of the data can later prove the identity of the sender along with
help of the proof of origin in case of denial of service. In non-repudiation, the sender can confirm
the delivery to the receiver with the real proof of delivery[1, 2].This security service is extensively
used in the verification phase of digital signatures.[2]
4.3.3 Access Control
Access control enables an authority to gain control and access to areas and resources in an
information system. An access control system provides security against unauthorized access
and usage of data. The term access in this context can mean reading, writing, modification or
execution of programs [1, 2].
4.3.4 Data Confidentiality
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) in ISO-17799 defined confidentiality as
”ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorized to have access” .In many cryp-
tosystems confidentiality is one of the major design goals to protect data from disclosure attack.
As defined by X.800 the service is very broad and includes confidentiality of the total message or
15
part of a message and also ensures protection against traffic analysis. In other words it prevents
traffic analysis and snooping.[1, 2]
4.3.5 Data Integrity
Data integrity is requiredTo protect data from unauthorized insertion, deletionmodification and
replaying by an attacker . It can protect the total message or the part of message.[1,2]
4.4 Security Mechanism
Security mechanisms include
• Encipherment
• Data Integrity
• Authentication exchange
• Traffic padding
• Routing control
• Notarization
• Access Control
• Digital Signature
16
Chapter 3
Literature Review
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5 ECC [Elliptic Curve Cryptography ]
Elliptic Curve Cryptography is based on a special type of elliptic curve which is of the form
y2+ b1xy + b2y = x
3 + a1x
2 +a2x + a3
ECC makes the existing cryptosystems more secured and more efficient as these cryptosystems
have smaller public-key certificates,smaller system parameters,faster implementations and other
factors such as lower power consumption etc. Therefore, ECC cryptosystem is the most preferred
cryptosystem.[7]
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is an assymetric key cryptography. In asymmetric key
cryptography each user generally have a pair of keys(a public key and a secret private key) . The
private key is the secret parameter of a particular user whereas the public key is distributed among
all users taking part in the communication.Public key algorithms require a set of constants that
should be predefined .For example Domain parameters in ECC. Asymmetric key cryptography,
unlike symmetric key cryptography, does not require any shared secret key between the sender
and receiver but is quite slower than symmetric key cryptography.[7]
The mathematical operations of ECC is defined over an elliptic curve over real numbers
y2 = x3 + ax + b,
where 4a3 + 27b2 = 0(non-singular elliptic curves)
Each value of the a and b gives a different elliptic curve.The points which lie on the curve
are all points (x, y) which satisfying the above equation along with the null point(a point at
infinity). The secret key is a random number whereas public key is a point on the curve obtained
by multiplying the private key with the base point G of the curve.Domain parameters of ECC
include the base point G, the curve parameters a and b,along with some other constants. [5]
6 Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem [ECDLP]
The classical or general DLP(discrete logarithm problem) is the following:
If b≡ak (mod p), where p is prime and k is any random integer.
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DLP is the problem to find k.
Similarly, ECDLP is the discrete log problem for elliptic curves.
i.e.If kP = Q, where P, Q are points on the curve Ep(a,b ) and k is an integer such that Q lies
on the curve
ECDLP is the problem of finding k knowing P and Q.
Notations:
E(Fq) is the set of all points on E whose all coordinates lie in Fq .
Fq denotes Fp
n.
Difficulty of Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) decides the security of
ECC-based signature. The high computational complexity of ECDLP is the reason of ECC-
based signatures being more secured than other cryptosystems-based signature.Since ECDLP is
muc tougher to solve than DLP ,the attacker first converts the ECDLP to DLP in most of the
attacks. These attacks have been discussed in further pages .[7]
7 Operations On Elliptic Curves
7.1 Point Addition
On an elliptic curve, point addition is the addition of two points J and K to obtain another point
L on the same elliptic curve.
For the points J (xJ , yJ) and K (xK , yK) and the resultant point L (xL, yL) has the coordinate
values as[6,7] :-
xL = m
2 - xJ - xK
yL = m(xJ - xL) - yJ
where slope m = ( yk - yJ)/(xk - xJ)
7.2 Point Doubling
If both the points J and K are same the coordinates of L are given as follows[6,7]:-
xL = m
2 - 2xJ
19
Figure 2: Point Addition
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yL = m(xJ - xL) - yJ
where Slope m = (3xJ
2 + a)/2yJ
7.3 Point Multiplication
In point multiplication, a point P on the elliptic curve is multiplied with a scalar(integral value)
k using elliptic curve equation to obtain another point Q on the same elliptic curve i.e. kP=Q
Point multiplication is achieved by two basic elliptic curve operations[6,7]
1. Point addition, adding two points J and K to obtain another point L i.e., L = J + K.
2. Point doubling, adding a point J to itself to obtain another point L i.e. L = 2J.
Point addition and doubling are explained above.
Here is a simple example of point multiplication.
Let P be a point on an elliptic curve. Let k be a scalar that is multiplied with the point P to
obtain another point Q on the curve. i.e. to find Q = kP.
If k = 11 then kP = 23.P = 2(2(2P) + P) + P.
Thus point multiplication uses point addition and point doubling repeatedly to find the result.
The above method is called double and add method for point multiplication. There are other
efficient methods for point multiplication such as NAF (Non Adjacent Form) and wNAF (win-
dowed NAF) method for point multiplication [3]
8 ECDSA - Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
This is one of the algorithm that is used for authentication of a message between 2 clients(Let
the clients be A and B).A has to sign the message using its private key to authenticate a message
sent by A. A sends the message and the signature to B. This signature can be verified only by
using the public key indeed send by A .[1]
ECDSA is a variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA).It operates on elliptic curves.
Both the clients have to agree up on Elliptic Curve domain parameters to send a signed message
from one to the other. Sender A has a key pair - a private key d(a randomly generated integer
21
Figure 3: Point Doubling
less than n, where n is the order of the curve) and a public key Q = d * G(G is the base point).
An overview of ECDSA process is defined below.
8.1 Signature Generation
[1,6] For signing a message m by sender A, using As private key d
1. Calculate e = HASH (m).
2. Select a random integer k from [1 ,n - 1]
3. Calculate r = x1 (mod n), where (x1, y1) = k * G. If r = 0, go to step 2
4. Calculate s = k−1(e + dr)mod(n). If s=0, go to step 2
5. The signature is the pair (r, s)
8.2 Signature Verification
[1,6] For B to authenticate A’s signature, B must have As public key Q
1. Verify that r and s are integers in [1,n - 1]. If not, the signature is invalid
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2. Calculate e = HASH (m), where HASH is the same function used in the signature generation
3. Calculate w = s−1mod(n)
4. Calculate u1 = ew(mod n) and u2 = rw (mod n)
5. Calculate (x1, y1) = u1G + u2QA
6. The signature is valid if x1 = r(mod n), invalid otherwise
9 Blind Signature
The concept of blind signature was first introduced by Chaum in 1982.It was mainly intro-
duced to enhance security of automated payment systems and electronic voting systems. Chaum
pointed out that the multiplicity and growth of electronic services may have an impact on con-
sumers privacy and extent of criminal use. Thus, blind signature cryptosystem is the need of
the hour.Moreover it is a fundamentally different kind of cryptosystem. This new cryptosystem
ensures anonymity and protects customers privacy during the use of secure electronic payment
systems. [5,8,13]
A blind signature scheme involves basically a group of requesters and a signer. Each requester
obtains a valid signature from the signer after sending an encrypted message to him.The signer
only signs the message without any idea of the contents of the message i.e. it does not decrypt it.
Later, the signer can verify the authenticity of the signature whenever he/she comes across the
message-signature pair.However, he/she cannot link the message-signature pair to the particular
phase of the signing protocol that has led to this pair.In blind signature the receiver
′
s identity is
always concealed. Therefore, according to Chaum a blind signature scheme should be intractable
and blindness property should hold good.[5,8,13]
9.1 Phases of Digital Signature
Most of the digital signature schemes are universally verifiable i.e. anyone using the signers
public key can verify whether the signature is authentic or not, and signature forgery is very
difficult. A digital signature consists of [5,8,13]
the following phases-
1) Signing phase: A sender first of all uses a hashing function to produce a message digest.Using
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private key of the sender the message digest is encrypted to get the digital signature. Then the
sender sends his message and its digital signature to a receiver.
2) Verification phase: When the receiver gets the message-signature pair, he inputs the message
into the same hashing function to get the first phase of the message digest. Then he decrypts
the digital signature by the senders public key to get the second phase of the message digest.
And finally he verifies both the message digests. If they are the same, the signature is valid;
otherwise, the signature could be forged.
9.2 Blind Signature
The signer signs the requesters message and knows nothing about it; moreover, no one knows
about the correspondence of the message-signature pair except the requester. A short illustration
of blind signature is described in the following [5,13]:-
1) Blinding phase: The sender chooses a random number called a blind factor to blind his mes-
sage such that the signer will not be able to view the contents of the message.
2) Signing phase: When the signer gets the blinded message, he encrypts the blinded message
using his private key and then sends back the blind signature to the sender.
3) Unblinding phase: The sender uses the blind factor used in (a) to recover the signers digital
signature from the blinded signature.
4) Signature Verification phase: Anyone can use the signers public key to verify whether the
signature is authentic or not[5,13].
10 Attacks On Digital Signature
Any ECC based signature derives its security from the fact that it is based on Elliptic curve
discrete logarithm problem and it is very difficult to solve an ECDLP, more difficult than Integer
Factorization problem or discrete logarithm problem.In cryptography, an attack is a method of
solving a problem. Specifically, the aim of an attack is to find a fast method of solving a problem
on which an encryption algorithm depends. The known methods of attack on the elliptic curve
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(EC) discrete log problem that work for all curves are slow, making encryption based on this
problem practical. However, several efficient methods for solving the EC discrete log problem for
specific types of elliptic curves are known. This means that one should make sure that the curve
one chooses for ones encoding does not fall into one of the several classes of curves on which the
problem is tractable. Below, we describe the Baby Step, Giant Step Method, which works for
all curves, but is slow.[12]
10.1 Baby Step, Giant Step Method
This is one of the fastest general methods of solving the ECDLP. The algorithm has approximately
sqrt(p) time and sqrt(p) space complexity, where p = ]E(Fq ).But this is not fast enough to be
practical. Ignoring logarithmic factors (sqrt(p)) is already large enough for the problem to be
intractable, we find that the running time is on the order of (sqrt(p)). The storage space required
is also on the order of (sqrt(p)), This algorithm is too slow to be of practical use in breaking
codes, as it is exponential in the length log N of the input. [12]
10.2 Key-Only-Attack
In the key-only-attack, Eve has access only to the public information released by Alice. To forge
a message, Eve needs to create Alices signature to convince Bob that the message is coming from
Alice. [1]
10.3 Known-Message-Attack
In the known-message-attack, Eve has access to one or more message-signature pairs. In other
words, Eve has access to some documents previously signed by Alice. Eve tries to create another
message and forge Alices signature on it. [1]
10.4 Chosen-Message-Attack
In the chosen-message-attack, Eve somehow makes Alice sign one or more messages for her. Eve
later creates another message, with the content she wants, and forges Alices signature on it.[1]
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If the attack is successful, the result is a forgery. There are essentially 2 types of forgery.
10.5 Existential Forgery
In an existential forgery, Eve may be able to create a valid message-signature pair, but not the
one that she can really use. In other words, a document has been forged, but the content is
randomly calculated. This type of forgery is probable but fortunately Eve cannot benefit from
it very much. Her message could be syntactically or semantically unintelligible. [1]
10.6 Selective Forgery
In selective forgery, Eve may be able to forge Alices signature on a message with the content
selectively chosen by Eve.Although this is beneficial to Eve, the probability of such a attack is
very low, but quite detrimental for Alice.[1]
11 Speeding Up Verifications In ECDSA
11.1 Certicom’s Proposal
ECDSA signatures are considered and conventionally are significantly faster RSA signatures.But
recent research suggest verification with RSA was found to be faster than verification with ECC
if considerable key size was used in RSA. Inorder to overcome this shortcoming, Certicom has
found a new way to speed up the verification step of ECDSA by nearly 40
11.2 Inverse Operations Minimization using Projective coordinate
system
In projective coordinate system the point (X1, Y1, Z1) corresponds to the point (X1/Z1, Y1/Z1
2)
in gaussian coordinate system and the equation for the elliptic curve becomes Y1
2 + X1Y1Z1
= X1
3Z1 + aX1
2Z1
2 + bZ1
4. In point multiplication, the point (X1, Y1) in gaussian coordinate
system is converted to (X1, Y1, 1) in projective coordinate system. After multiplication is over
the result (X1, Y1, Z1) is converted to the gaussian coordinates as (X1/Z1, Y1/Z1
2)[11]
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(Z cannot be equal to 0 as if Z = 0, then the point is a null point or in other words point at
infinity)
11.2.1 Point Addition
In projective coordinate system for adding two points let
(Xa ,Ya ,Za) + (Xb ,Yb ,Zb ) = (Xc ,Yc ,Zc)
A = Yb Za2 + Ya
B = Xb Za + Xa
C = ZaB
D = B2(C + aZa2)
Zc = C
2
E = A.C
Xc = A2 + D + E
F = Xc + Xb Zc
G = Xc + Yb Zc
Yc = E.F + ZcG
Zb = 1(in point addition one operand will definitely be the input to a point in point multiplica-
tion operation, which is a gaussian coordinate point)[11]
11.2.2 Point doubling
In projective coordinate system for doubling a point let 2(Xa ,Yb , Za ) = (Xb ,Yb ,Zb )
Zb = Xa
2 Za
2
Xb = Xa
4 + bZa
4
Yb = bZa
4 Zb + Xb (aZb + Ya
2 + bZa
4 )[11]
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12 Proposed Scheme
12.1 Participants
The scheme involves 3 participants:
• Sender • Signer(Trusted Authority) • Verifier
12.2 Description
12.2.0.1 Set-up Phase For each message that has to be signed the Signer generates 2 ran-
dom integers(d1,d2) which will be the private keys for the particular session. Then it calculates
the public key(Y) as :
Y= d1 B1 + d2 B2 ,
where B1 and B2 are two base points on an elliptic curve(Ep(a,b)) over Fq ) and a,b and p are
curve parameters.
12.2.0.2 Blinding Phase When the setup phase is over, the sender first of all converts the
message to a point on the curve and then generates 2 random integers c1 and c2 and blinds the
message M as:
bm = m(c1 B1 +c2 B2)
where m is x-coordinate of the message(M) After the message is blinded, the sender sends
the blinded message to the signer to get signed message(s).
12.2.0.3 Signing Phase The signer on receiving the blinded message generates 2 random
integers z1 and z2 to give a point on the curve (Q) as:
Q= z1 B1 +z2 B2
Using z1 and z2 the signer generates 2 signatures S1 and S2 as:
S1= bm+(d1+ z1)a B1
S2= bm+(d2+ z2)a B2
where a is a random integer.
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Finally point R is calculated as
R = a*Q.
12.2.0.4 Unblinding Phase The signature is un-blinded through the following equations
to get X1 and X2
i = [( c1 B1)
−1+( c2 B2)−1] m
X1= S1 + i
X2= S2 + i
Here c1 and c2 are integers.
12.2.0.5 Verification Now a point N is calculated using the equation :- N = X1 + X2 - aY
The signature can now be verified by comparing the points N and R.
12.3 Correctness
N = X1 + X2 - aY
= S1 + i + S2 + i - a(d1B1 + d2B2)
= bm+(d1+ z1)a B1 + [( c1 B1)
−1+( c2 B2)−1] m
+ bm+(d2+ z2)a B2 + [( c1 B1)
−1+( c2 B2)−1] m - a(d1B1 + d2B2)
= m(c1 B1 + c2 B2) + (d1+ z1)a B1 + [( c1 B1)
−1+( c2 B2)−1] m
+ m(c1 B1 + c2 B2) + (d2+ z2)a B2 + [( c1 B1)
−1+( c2 B2)−1] m
- a(d1B1 + d2B2)
= a(z1 B1 +z2 B2)
= aQ
= R
13 Security Analysis
13.1 Key-only-attack
For the key-only-attack to be possible, Eve(attacker) has to create a valid signature pair. Let
Eve is able to create the signature pair. This implies that the signer is compromised, which is
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quite rare. But this will not help as in the unblinding stage, Eve will not be able to unblind the
signature pair as it will not be having the required parameters( c1 and c2 ) and extraction of c1
and c2 is impossible due to ECDLP.
bm = m(c1B1 + c2B2)
= c
′
B
To determine c
′
is cumbersome due to ECDLP and even if c
′
is known, determination of c1
and c2 is nearly impossible and this is the reason for using double parameters.
13.2 Known-message-attack
In the known-message-attack, Eve has to access one or more message-signature pair and then
generate a signature for her message. But this is not possible and is explained as below.
Let Eve has a message-signature triplet (m,x1,x2) and wants to generate signature for message
m
′
. So first of all she has to generate blind signature pair (s1
′
, s2
′
) and then the un-blinded
signature pair (x1
′
, x2
′
). Then the signatures are sent to the verifier for verification. But the
verifier will not be able to verify the signature because the verifier will be having public key
corresponding to the private key used by The Actual Signer for some message m.
But Eve can easily access the public key(Y) issued by The Actual Signer to the Verifier for some
message m and use it for her own message(m) instead. But she cannot do this because she will
be encountering the ECDLP.
S1
′′
= bm
′′
+ (d1
′′
+ z1
′′
)a
′′
B1
or S1
′′
- bm
′′
= (d1
′′
+ z1
′′
)a
′′
B1
or S1
′′
- bm
′′
= d1
′′′
B1
or S1
′′′
= d1
′′′
B1
To determine d1
′′′
Eve has to solve ECDLP and then to extract d1
′′
from d1
′′′
is nearly
impossible; justifying the use of double parameters.
13.3 Chosen-message-attack
For the same reasons explained for the infeasibility of known-message-attack the chosen-message
attack is impossible thereby indicating that this signature is highly secured. Determination of
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d2
′′
involves similar difficulties.
14 Performance Evaluation
Any digital signature is compared on the basis of number of operations rather on the basis of
time complexity. The following notations are used to estimate the operating overhead:
TMUL: the time required for the modular multiplication.
TEXP : the time required for the modular exponentiation.
TINV : the time required for the modular inversion.
TECMUL: the time required for the multiplication of a scalar and an elliptic curve point.
TECADD: the required time for the addition of two points over an elliptic curve.
Modular addition operations add negligibly to the operating overhead. The following table com-
pares our scheme with 2 other standard schemes[].
Phase Proposed Scheme Scheme1 Scheme2
SetUp 2TECMUL 3TECMUL 2TECMUL
Blinding 3TECMUL + 1 TECADD 2TECMUL + 10TMUL+6TINV 2TECMUL
Signing 5TECMUL + 3 TECADD + 2TMUL 6TMUL 2TECMUL
Unblinding 3TECMUL + 3TECADD 10TMUL+2TINV 1TECMUL+3TMUL
Verification 1TECMUL + TECADD 2TECMUL 1TECMUL
Though the computational overhead of our scheme is more than Scheme1 and Scheme2,but
is much more secure as compared to the 2 Schemes as:
•The attacker has to solve an ECDLP at every stage to get any information
•Even if the attacker is able to get solve the ECDLP,he/she cannot get hold of any private pa-
rameter as almost in all stages there is a linear combination of the private parameters.
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15 Implementation
15.1 SetUp
Fist of all the signer choose an appropriate but random set of curve parameters:
• p=54167
• a=11
• b=24
• Generating Points::
b1= (2633,66)
b2= (2837,210)
The signer generates d1 =3 and d2 =7 as private keys and then computes the public key
Y=(41441,2313)
15.2 Message To Point Conversion
Koblitz’s Method was used to convert the message to a point.In this method the message is fist
converted to a number(m) and then the method is applied to get a point M which is as follows[9]:
• Choose a random integer k≥1280
• For i=0 to k-1
• x=km+i, where x is the x-coordinate of the point(M)
• Find corresponding y-coordinate
• If y exists then break;else continue
The message( animesh chhOtaray== gfgfdfhdgdflgfglldsl122443) is converted to 83614777164082643
7308388 446501857420581216394430620711666956091614807749661404062052491626331236286747928743070
55075855626 is converted to M(1902,179)
15.3 Blinding
Then the blinding algorithm was used to get blinded message (14532,37455) which is send to the
signer for signing.
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15.4 Signing
The signer generates 2 signatures: s1 = (2946,28451) and s2= (2560,45286) which are sent to the
sender for unblinding.
15.5 Unblinding
The sender generates 2 signatures x1 = (27135,23571) and x2 = (45642,45441) using s1 and s2
which are sent to the verifier along with some other parameters for verifying.
15.6 Verification
The signature is verified using the verification algorithm and the resultof verification is published
as true/false.In this case the resulti is true.
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Figure 4: Implementation Screenshot
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16 Conclusion
Public key encryption can be used to eliminate problems involved with conventional encryption.
It however has not managed to be as widely accepted as conventional encryption because it intro-
duces a lot of overheads. Therefore it is very important to find ways to reduce the overhead yet
not sacrificing on other aspects of security. The ECC has been shown to have many advantages
due to its ability to provide the same level of security as any cryptosystem yet using shorter
keys. However its disadvantage which may even hide its attractiveness is its lack of maturity,
as mathematicians believe that enough research has not yet been done in ECDLP. Thus a blind
signature along with ECDSA promises to be a bright prospect in designing secure and efficient
systems such as e-voting systems.
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